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ABSTRACT 
The COVID-19 pandemic has presented a unique 
and challenging environment for aeromedical 
organisations. We present lessons learnt during 
the development and implementation of our 
operational processes and procedures at The 
Royal Flying Doctor Service (RFDS) Western 
Operations for the transfer of suspected COVID-
19 patients. To date, we have conducted 105 
such fixed-wing transfers. The unique geography 
and health care system of Western Australia 
mandates that long-range, fixed-wing transfers 
are often required to centralised tertiary care.  
These lessons learnt provide a framework for the 
essential logistical, equipment and human factor 
considerations for developing an effective 
system. The translation of predominantly 
hospital-centric protocols into the aviation 
environment requires careful forethought, 
effective leadership and teamwork. Conducting 
COVID-19 suspected aeromedical retrievals 
significantly impacts all aeromedical retrieval 
operations and aeromedical personnel that 




The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the 
challenges inherent in the transfer of patients with 
highly contagious pathogens. The inherent risks in 
this setting include: 
• inability to maintain appropriate physical 
distancing1,  
• prolonged patient exposure time2  
• the requirement to perform aerosol-generating 
procedures3.  
• the potential risk of high viral load within the 
enclosed aircraft cabin.  
• inability to extricate from the environment 
 
Aeromedical organisations must ensure both staff 
safety and confidence to conduct these missions 
and preserve operational capability through well-
developed procedures, training, and appropriate 
personal protective equipment (PPE) in an evolving 
 
and uncertain environment. A further consideration 
is the potential for aeromedical staff to become 
vectors for community pathogen transmission; 
therefore, prevention is both a social and moral 
obligation. It follows that a comprehensive process 
which considers the precautionary steps before, 
during and after patient contact is required.  
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COVIC1-19 
AEROMEDICAL TRASNFER PROCESS 
Team Selection, Leadership and Communication 
Early identification and careful selection of 
appropriately experienced personnel to form a 
COVID-19 protocol development team is essential. 
Comprising representatives from aviation, 
engineering and clinical services, the protocol 
development team must be motivated, have strong 
problem-solving capabilities and require adequate 
resourcing. There is a responsibility of clinical staff 
to impress upon non-clinical managers and 
executives the importance of thorough preparation 
and facilitate an understanding of the demands 
inherent in undertaking these missions. Managers, in 
turn, are instrumental in securing funding, liaising 
across health sector collaborators and providing 
insight into projected operational impact. We 
recommend a senior member of staff is appointed as 
clinical lead for the organisation’s pandemic 
response.  This individual is to act as a conduit for 
the dissemination of timely and accurate 
information to front line personnel. Overwhelming 
and incorrect information distributed amongst staff 
poses a significant barrier to effective 
implementation of protocols. They also play a vital 
role in demonstrating a commitment to placing staff 
safety as a priority, further reflected in all policies 
and procedures. 
 
Understanding the Implications of COVID-19 in 
the Aeromedical Retrieval Environment 
Droplet transmission of COVID-19 presents a 
significant challenge when an aircraft Environment 
Control System (ECS) causes significant air 
movement within a cabin. A full understanding of an 
aircraft’s specific ECS is required and discussions 
with engineers recommended. In our aircraft, this 
resulted in the reconfiguration of the on-board 
seating arrangements to sit staff outside of ECS 
airflow from patients and enabled the cockpit to be 
determined as low risk of droplet transmission, when 
an additional protective shield was installed.  
Infected patients are a known reservoir for 
respiratory pathogens4; therefore, once loaded, we 
deemed all exposed surfaces within the cabin as a 
potential fomite risk. We found this gross 




An aircraft requires significant preparation in order 
to minimise potential contamination during 
missions. A pre-flight checklist is necessary to verify 
and minimise deviation from a set standard5 to 
ensure full decontamination is possible post-flight. 
Equipment storage methods were modified to utilise 
rigid plastic boxes that enabled both 
compartmentalisation and easier decontamination.  
The process requires careful design and testing to 
ensure it is both streamlined and effective but 
minimises any cross-contamination risk. 
 
Setting up a Decontamination Area 
 
A critical part of developing a safe COVID-19 
aeromedical retrieval process is establishing a 
functional decontamination area, for use upon 
completion of the retrieval mission. The area we 
devised utilised the Department of Fire and 
Emergency Services (DFES) directive6 hot, warm 
and cool zoning (Figure 1) that applies the principle 
of sequential reduction in potential viral load. The 
requirements for a suitable area are that it is 
enclosed and cordoned off, has direct access to 
aerodrome apron, and at least 4 by 8 metres in size. 
Demarcation of zones needs to be clear, and 
















Legend: Decontamination zones and overall 
positioning of equipment utilised by Royal Flying 




Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) 
PPE selection was based on requirements to protect 
from droplet and contact transmission. Additional 
considerations for PPE were: 
• need for protection in austere weather,  
• comfort and durability during long transfers 
• visibility.  
PPE selected must undergo testing for suitability in 
the associated aeromedical environment. Given the 
innate risks associated with COVID-19 patient 
transfers a conservative strategy and high standard 
of PPE is recommended. We utilised PPE that 
included a combination of coveralls with 50mm 
reflective strips, double surgical gloves (inner 
coverall and outer coverall), N95/P2 mask, visor and 
boots. The coveralls selected were hooded and rated 
for International Standards Organisation (ISO) type 5 
protection (airborne particle protection) and type 6 
protection (light spray protection) and CE marked to 
meet the European standards for chemical 
protection type 3. When available, Powered Air 
Purifier Respirator (PAPR) devices were incorporated 
for the highest risk patients and procedures. PPE 
was maintained from donning prior to patient 
exposure until the completion of the mission and 




The decontamination process requires forethought 
and adequate trialling to co-ordinate the movement 
of patient, personnel, and equipment from the 
aircraft, prevent error and ensure practicality. 
Once within the decontamination area, aide 
memoires provided a visual reference for staff. Being 
less familiar with PPE, we advocated that pilots doff 
first following a checklist delivered by the clinical 
crew following which they followed a similar 
checklist to assist clinical staff. In our experience, 
this helped develop a team approach to the 
decontamination and utilised the pilots’ familiarity 
with checklists. Verbal delivery of the checklists 
increased both compliance and engagement, in 
keeping with previous studies7. Doffing is known to 
be one of the highest risk times for contamination8, 
and thus, a two-person process was mandated to 
mitigate the risks of doffing while fatigued following 
a long transfer. Following doffing, equipment was 
decontaminated. Procedures were designed to 
prevent any contact of the crew’s skin or mucous 
membranes with potentially contaminated surfaces 
(equipment, flight PPE). Alcohol-based hand rub was 
utilised to sterilise hands during the 
decontamination procedure that was based upon 
Ebola protocols9 but rationalised for COVID-19. 
Decontamination of the aircraft was conducted with 
a fogger utilising Australian Therapeutic Goods 
Administration approved Nanoncyin ® solution. The 
decontamination processes aim to return assets to 
service as soon as possible and requires a clear 
distinction between clean and contaminated.    
 
Operational Impact 
A robust and reproducible risk assessment tool was 
a key component of the tasking process, as 
determining a mission as COVID-19 risk has 
significant implications; reducing operational 
capability and increasing both response- and on-
scene time. Due to pre- and post-flight 
requirements, a COVID-19 mission would generally 
encompass the entire tasking availability for a flight 
crew. The risk assessment tool should be developed 
alongside other agencies that are involved with 
patient care from primary location to receiving 
hospital to ensure that it is consistent. The risk 
assessment by crews conducting the missions can 
be both influenced to be more conservative (inherent 
risks of transfer, see above) or more liberal (human 
factors of full PPE retrievals, see below).  The risk 
assessment also needs to evolve with local 
epidemiology and involvement of infectious disease 
specialists prudent.  
 
Human Factors and Education 
COVID-19 transfers place extra cognitive burden and 
stress upon staff, therefore strict standardisation is 
of paramount importance for the protection of health 
care workers10. Training should be team-based and 
conducted face-to-face, encompassing both 
theoretical and practical components of PPE and the 
entire COVID-19 patient transfer process. Web-
based learning resources provided reference and 
supplemental continuing education. Wearing COVID-
19 PPE in flight impacts dexterity, reduces sensory 
input, increases fatigue and risks of dehydration. 
Clinical skills practice in PPE mitigated some of 
these issues and should include basic skills (e.g. 
cannulation), and advanced skills (e.g. rapid 
sequence inductions) with consolidation of learning 
through immersive simulation training. Time spent 
on training is invaluable to ensuring the value of a 
well-developed system is realised whilst increasing 
flight crew’s operational confidence. 
To effectively execute COVID-19 missions, 
mandatory pre-flight briefings were initiated5. 
Conducted by senior medical personnel, these 
enabled development of a shared mental model of 
patient care, and reduced the cognitive load of on-
scene decision through pre-emptive case discussion 
and trouble-shooting. 
 
Review and Audit 
The process should be reviewed regularly through 
post flight debrief and audit to ensure it evolves 
accordingly as more evidence and experience is 
available.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The challenges that COVID-19 present to 
aeromedical transfers are eminently surmountable. 
With good leadership, the qualities of flexibility and 
resilience that led to the selection of many 
aeromedical staff can be utilised to incorporate a 
comprehensive system that facilitates the safe 
transfer of COVID-19 suspected patients.  
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